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Patronage Driven Corruption Undermining  
the Fight against Poverty in Uganda 
 
Mbabazi Godfrey and Pyeong Jun Yu 
Yonsei University Wonju Campus, Korea 
 
Abstract: Uganda has been a den of corruption for a long time, a “disease” that has eaten up 
the entire society. Surprisingly or not, the Ugandan political machine has ensured that this 
practice thrives to benefit its interests at the expense of the majority poor. This study reveals that 
Uganda’s patronage and corruption quandary emanated from the British Colonial 
administrative system which was based on using a section of local people to rule over the rest 
and consequently rewarded them for supporting their policies and interests. With the intentioned 
absence of democratic rule, institutions that could condemn, exert public control and demand 
accountability from public officials never developed. As a result, evidence shows that despite 
Uganda’s strong anti-corruption framework, patronage and corruption have continued to thrive 
largely due to the failure of anti-corruption institutions to enforce the anti-corruption framework 
making the fight against corruption a losing battle. 
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Introduction  
Corruption presents itself in a variety of forms and though more prevalent in developing 
countries it surely takes a good share of developed counties’ budgets as well. This has led 
countries and international organizations to theorize and formulate different kinds of response 
scenarios inform of measures to curb this ever present malady. It’s nearly impossible that one 
looks at a newspaper without stories on corruption scandals around the world, an indication that 
corruption isn’t a problem for a select few but for all countries around the world. 
As for developing countries, present-day scholars have gone ahead to create connections 
between colonialism and the current state of affairs prevailing in different countries. In this line 
of analysis, a number of quantitative research both within and across nations, have related 
colonial-era policies and institutions to post-independence variations in economic growth 
(Englebert, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; 2002) and corruption, (Treiman, 
2000). One strand of this literature indicates that Europeans adopted different colonization 
policies with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans couldn’t settle due to 
high mortality rates, the colonial administration established extractive institutions. Though a 
number of studies about patronage have been done on Uganda (Titeca 2006; Mwenda and 
Tangiri 2005; Maraka, 2009) patronage and donor reforms (Tangiri and Mwenda, 2011), 
cronyism (Tangiri and Mwenda, 2001), none has addressed the dilemma of why despite the 
presence of an excellent legal and institutional framework for anti-corruption in Uganda, 
corruption keeps increasing. In this article, we address this predicament by showing the large 
implementation gap causing the failure of anti-corruption efforts that undermine the fight against 
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poverty to be a result of a complex relationship involving British colonial policies, patronage and 
weak institutions.  
We also examine the applicability colonial legacy perspective to Uganda’s context and 
along the way answer the questions of whether or not patronage and corruption in Uganda 
originated from the British colonial administration. Next we try to find out why the fight against 
corruption in Uganda has failed?, lastly we also look at how the weakness of anti-corruption 
institutions in the fight against corruption has affected poverty reduction efforts. In the following 
sections, we take a look the definitions of corruption paving way for the analysis of the different 
perspectives on corruption particularly, socio-cultural, economic and political perspectives. We 
then look at the British colonial legacy and the origin of patronage in Uganda. Building on the 
preceding section, we explore how political patronage and corruption exist in Uganda today. 
Afterwards, we analyze why anti-corruption measures have failed by emphasizing the weakness 
of institutions, and effects of corruption on government’s efforts to fight poverty respectively. 
Lastly, we conclude and offer some recommendations. .  
 
Conceptualizing Corruption 
Most research done on corruption usually begins by not only stating what corruption is but by 
also demonstrating how tough it is to assign a precise meaning to this concept. In the context of 
developing countries, the World Bank has singled out Corruption as the biggest challenge to 
economic and social development (World Bank, 1997). This however doesn’t mean that this 
malady is absent in developed countries, corruption is seen to respect no society and transcends 
boundaries of developed and underdeveloped countries as it does in democracies and 
dictatorships (Lui, 2007). To democracies for instance, corruption strikes the basic principles on 
which democracy rests particularly impartiality of institutions, and transparency than it does in 
dictatorships. Therefore corruption is globally present and widely resented (Rothstein and 
Teorell, 2008). 
In light of the above, corruption has been commonly defined as “the abuse public power 
for private gain” (Amundsen, Sissener, and Soreide, 2000). World Bank’s definition of 
corruption takes a slightly different format as “the use of public office for private gain” (World 
Bank, 1997).  To Deflem, corruption is defined in reference to the illegal acts related to power 
offices, institutions and other politically related spheres (Deflem, 1995).  Yet Rothstein and 
Teorell define corruption as “the violation of non-discrimination norms governing the behavior 
of holders of public office that are motivated by private gain” (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). If 
an analysis of most definitions of corruption is made, many illegal activities such as bribery, 
extortion become either part of corruption or are understood as distinct from corruption. Thus, 
the concept is broadly defined or sometimes not defined at all (Williams, 1981). All in all, this 
study adopts Johnston’s definition which takes corruption to involve “the abuse of trust, 
generally one involving public power, for private benefit which often, but by no means always, 
comes inform of money” (Johnston, 2005, 11) 
 
Perspectives on Corruption 
The search for a clear understanding of corruption has led researchers to consider a broad range 
of perspectives to unravel its causes. Here, we take a look at three perspectives; the social-
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cultural, economic, and political perspective to which we believe can highlight the intricacies of 
Uganda’s corruption quandary, help trace its origin and causes, discover why efforts to fight it 
have failed, and provide a basis for devising  relevant measures of eliminating corruption. 
 
Socio-cultural perspective  
In the field of sociology, social problems are defined as “conditions growing out of 
human interactions that are considered undesirable by a significant number of people who 
believe they can be resolved through preventative or remedial action” (Merton and Nisbet 1961, 
92). One of the classifications of social problems is from the socio-cultural perspective where 
crime is categorized. Corruption is a crime against humanity since it deviates from the legally 
accepted standards of society such as norms and rules. Where corruption exists, meaningful 
development can hardly occur. Therefore it is a disintegrative social factor which often hinders 
social, political and economic development of nations 
Contextually, corruption is perceived differently depending on the differences in societal 
norms (Bardham, 1997). This makes the generalization of measures to curb corruption 
questionable since what constitutes an act of corruption in one country could be entirely 
acceptable in another. Take for instance the culture of gift giving which to some countries is part 
and partial of their life, does it qualify as corruption? Much as past literature has thrown a lot of 
criticism at the culture of gift giving equating it to bribery and a justification for tolerating 
corruption (Hope, 2000), perceiving this culture as act of corruption seems unfair to such 
societies that have practiced it for centuries. In this respect, while the custom of gift giving on 
one hand signifies the importance of social relations (Steidlmeier, 1999), on the other hand it is 
an illegal exchange that goes against other society’s rules and regulations. Therefore, for clarity, 
a lucid demarcation should be made on issues of culture and corruption in different societies if an 
acceptable definition of corruption and its composition is to be reached.   
   
Economic Perspective  
The economic perspective on corruption tries to explain how economic factors impact the spread 
of corruption and its effects on society. Economic theory on corruption such as public choice 
argues that corruption just like rent seeking is a result of poorly channeled self-interest that seeks 
to maximize at the expense of the public good (Mbaku, 1998) Taking for instance grand 
corruption or even petty corruption in the civil service; these two can seriously hamper the 
ability of the state to provide services and at the same time can act as an extra tax on citizens in 
the process of accessing services.  
Petty corruption in form of bribes by public officials has been justified in some circles as 
a way through which public officials meet their cost of living due to low salaries earned from 
government jobs (Pope, 2000). Yet Kaufmann in his “grease-the-wheels” argument asserts that, 
“bribery can be an efficient way of getting around burdensome regulations and ineffective legal 
systems” (Kaufmann (2011). This argument is however lacking especially if considered in the 
public sector context where public goods are allocated irrespective of who is paying the highest 
price. Indeed, Ades and Di Tella (1997), conclude that corruption acts mainly as “a sand-in-the-
machine”. Therefore to root out this justification in public office, civil service reforms including 
increased pay and rotation of workers should be implemented in order to disrupt informal links 
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from developing. 
Furthermore, corruption has also been correlated with income inequality and poverty 
since proceeds from corruption most likely accrue to the well-connected members in society who 
happen to be the “haves” other than “the have-nots” (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, 2002). 
One of the major roles of government is to ensure equitable distribution of resources however; 
corruption distorts this redistributive role of the state and ensures that better connected 
individuals get opportunities to climb up the economic ladder (Tanzi, 1998). Accordingly, 
Shleifer and Vishny argue that, to succeed in shifting away resources from productive activities 
like education and heath which has a direct bearing on the life of the poor requires a high degree 
of secrecy to keep the network intact and secure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). In other words, 
corruption is possible simply because those involved have protection and assurance.  
 
Political Perspective  
Citizens elect leaders with an understanding that they will take care of them. Most democratic 
countries indeed fulfill this wish by providing for their citizens transparently and in the most 
convenient ways. Similarly, La Porta et al, 1999), shares a related view that “good governments 
contribute to success in economic development”, definitely with the intention of enhancing the 
quality of life for their citizens. That said, Shleifer argues that government performance is 
determined by political needs (Shleifer and vishny, 1993). Such needs are heavily reflected in the 
kind of governance that exist in a particular context, consequently, its plausible to say that 
different governance structures such as democracies and dictatorships have political needs 
shaped by their beliefs and how they benefit politically.  
On that basis therefore, political perspective on corruption normally takes the shape of 
political patronage and corruption which varies with the type of political system in question. To 
this end, the nature, scope, and potential of political corruption might take different forms in a 
democracy compared to that in a dictatorship. Thus political corruption can reveal itself in a 
variety of forms such as clientelism, patronage, nepotism, and so forth with a range of 
characteristics (Bratsis, 2003). Political corruption indeed is a complex phenomenon and for its 
terrorizing impact to be clearly understood, it is imperative that we find out why it is more 
visible in some societies than others, its origins, and what majorly explain its existence. Overall, 
institutions and policies are shaped by those in power to stay in power and amass resources (La 
Porta et al, 1999). This perspective can closely be related to the situation in uganda as will 
explained in the subsequent sections.   
 
Methodology 
The study uses a qualitative approach mainly a review of diferent literatures on colonialism, 
patronage and corruption. In addition, both international organizations’ websites such as the 
World Bank and IMF to mention but a few, and as well as instititution websites of agencies in 
Uganda have been searched for information and possible data that has been used to illustrate how 
Uganda rates in terms of crruption with other countries in africa.   
 
Figure 1: A Framework for the study of patronage, corruption and the failure of ant-corruption 
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Colonial legacy and the Origin of Patronage in Uganda 
Before the arrival of the British imperialists, the area now known as Uganda was made up of 
different Kingdoms that had different administrative structures and relationships based on trade 
and military might (Ward, 1991). Notably among them were Buganda and Bunyoro Kingdoms. 
The first signs of imperial aggression came with the arrival of protestant and catholic 
missionaries in 1877 and 1879 representing the interests of Britain and France respectively. The 
rivalry between the two Christian factions sooner than later exploded into war in 1892 of which 
the Protestants with the help of the Imperial British East African Company came out victorious 
(Ward, 1991).  
Two years down the road, the British government formally declared a protectorate over 
Uganda, and Christianity came to dominate the political arena of Buganda and Uganda later on. 
The alliance between the British and Buganda led to the signing of the 1900 Buganda Agreement 
and the eventual extension of British rule to other parts of Uganda. Britain needed local 
collaboration to make her occupation of Uganda effective and cheap and chose patronage as the 
best way to deepen this new found relationship with Buganda. The Kingdom received big chunks 
of land and its officials were given permission to collect taxes on behalf of the colonial 
government (Moncrieffe, 2004). Buganda local chiefs became elevated to fill most of the 
positions in the colonial administration (International Crisis Group, 2012), in addition to 
becoming sub-imperialists in other parts of Uganda. This indirect system of using Buganda to 
rule over other Ugandans became systematized later on as reflected in the appointment of 
Ministers and majority public servants to image the tribe of the president at a time.  
As per the categorization made by Acemoglu et al. (2001), Uganda was one of those 
countries seen as unfit for British settlers which forced the colonial administration to concentrate 
on putting up extractive institutions to aid in the drawing out of resources. The construction of 
the Uganda railway to connect Uganda to the East Africa coast so as to fasten the movement of 
both agricultural and natural resources such as cotton and copper was a clear testament to that 
effect (Bamber, 2001). Alternatively, colonies that were found fit for European settlement, 
received high numbers of European settlers who went ahead to demand institutions similar to 
those in Europe to protect property rights, guard against government expropriations, rule of law 
to mention but a few (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau, 
2006). Consequently, political, social and administrative institutions that sprung up were heavily 
reliant on, and meant to facilitate the interests of the British colonial administration. 
According to Ruzindana, (1997, 134) the colonial period offered no possibility that the 
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indigenous people employed in the public service, could be seriously involved in corruption 
because major decisions were made by the colonial officials. Thus, through the indirect rule 
policy that was based on coercion and subjugation of one tribe against others, there was no room 
for democratic rule, and as result, institutions that could condemn, exert public control and 
demand accountability from public officials never developed. Thus, the actions of the British to 
distribute incentives based on who was loyal and supportive of their policies was clearly a 
patronage strategy that later on became evident in Ugandan politics and administration.  
Upon the attainment of independence in 1962, the elites who took over Uganda’s 
administration inherited a colonial administrative system that used a mixture of favors and 
excessive force to accomplish their own agendas. These elites abolished the independence 
constitution resulting into the postponement of elections and out of this situation, “corruption 
emerged reflecting not merely economic greed but also the realities of political survival since the 
continued support of the rulers was based on patronage which could only be sustained by a 
continuous flow of favors to one’s followers” (Ruzindana, 1997, 134). Thus, patronage politics 
in Uganda- then and now- can been seen as a direct progeny of the British colonial system. It 
was used then and is still being used to ensure that the interests of those in authority are served.  
 
Patronage and Corruption in Uganda today 
        Museveni’s accession to power as the President of Uganda in 1986 was cherished and 
indeed supported by many people both within and outside of Uganda. In his book, “What is 
Africa’s problem”? Museveni concluded that Africa’s problem was leaders who overstayed in 
power (Museveni, 1992).  In his 28 year reign until now, Museveni undertook reforms as 
prescribed by World Bank and IMF inform of structural adjustment programs at least until 1995. 
This meant not only shifting key economic decisions from the state to the private sector but most 
importantly, it was a restructuring of Uganda’s politics which had seen previous governments 
use state control of the economy to build political support either through rewarding their 
supporters or buying off potential opponents.  
Between 1992 and 1995, his reforms aimed at reducing the size of government but back 
tracked after 1996, as he entered a period of electoral politics. The president realized that to win 
over an ethnically diverse population, he needed to accommodate the interests of powerful elites 
and at the same time provide at least a minimum level of public goods for the masses. 
Paradoxically, the interests of the powerful elites are in most cases inconsistent with those of 
their constituents. Whereas the general population is more concerned with good roads, hospitals, 
schools etc, the elites are more interested in private goods such as positions of power, high 
paying jobs and opportunities for corruption (Johnston, 1997). Through these, Museveni has 
created a political machine and with the help of the army, he seems destined for life presidency.  
Considering the massive theft of state funds that has rocked the country recently in form 
of corruption scandals involving powerful government officials on whom no action has been 
taken, it is plausible to say that patronage and corruption have been well exercised in Uganda. 
Since 2007, government has been involved in a number of high profile scandals and despite 
compelling evidence presented against some of the ministers and ruling party officials, justice 
has not been served due to political interference from the highest office. The failure of 
responsible institutions to prosecute corrupt officials citing political interference has led majority 
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of Ugandans to believe that through these scandals, the ruling party systematically secures funds 
for its patronage network.  
 
Table 1: Major patronage driven corruption Scandals 
Corruption Scandals  Amount   Officials Implicated 
CHOGM1 (2007) $ 27 Million  Former Vice-President Prof Gilbert Bukenya, Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi  
Current Minister for ICT John Nasasira & his Deputy  
Foreign Affairs Minister Sam Kutesa   
Global Fund (2008) $38 Million Former Health Minister Jim Muhwezi and his    
Temangalo (2008)  $4.3 Million  Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi, & Businessman Amos Nzeyi  
National ID (2010)  $7.5 Million Former Minister for General Duties Kiddu Makubuya,  
Former Internal Affairs Minister Kirunda Kivejinja & 
 Local Government Permanent Secretary Steven Kagoda   
Bicycle scam (2011) $1.7 Million Permanent Secretary Ministry of Local Government  
Pensions (2012) $66.7 Million Ministry of Public Service Officials 
OPM2 (2012) $19.7 Million Principle Accountant in Prime Minister’s Office  
 
Source: Major Media Houses in Uganda 
The Ibrahim Foundation (2011) index on corruption in bureaucracy ranked Uganda 
among the worst performers in this category with a score of 28.6 compared to Rwanda for 
instance with a score of 57.1 in 2010/2011 (Ibrahim Foundation, 2011). Considering corruption 
in government and public officials both elected and appointed, a dimension that assesses the 
level of vested cronyism in, and corruption of, public officials, Uganda’s performance again 
leaves a lot to be desired. When compared to Africa’s best performers, say, Botswana and 
Mauritius and as well as Uganda’s neighbors Tanzania and Rwanda in the year 2010/2011, 
Uganda’s performance is rated as “poor”, an indication of how leaders are at the fore front of 
embezzling government resources ( Inspector General of Government, 2011) 
 
Figure 2: Corruption in government and of Public Officials 
                                
1 CHOGM is an abbreviated form for “Commonwealth Heads of States meeting” 
2 OPM refers to “Office of the Prime Minister” 
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Source: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2011 
         
Districts creation in Uganda as opposed to extending services closer to the rural people, 
has been to widen Museveni’s political patronage net (Green, 2010; Crook, 2003). Uganda had a 
total of 33 districts in 1986 when President Museveni came to power. This number had grown to 
114 districts by 2010 and considering that there were only 56 districts in 2002 (MoLG, 2013), 
the rest have normally come as promises on the eve of election years. “As noted in Acholi Times 
article on July 16
th
 2012, creation of districts signifies jobs, council allowances, and new 
Members of Parliament plus bureaucrats’ salaries with more control over resources”. Mwenda 
and Tangiri (2005) concur that “state elites have dispensed government controlled economic 
resources such as jobs, credits, licenses, contracts social services to select groups and persons 
whose support they wished to secure.” Through such a structure, the ruling party keeps its 
supporters happy and the network running. 
The economic and political marginalization of Northern Uganda and the subsequent 
development of the south and west have been given a patronage connotation. As the south and 
the west were experiencing economic, political and social transformation, the North has been 
ravaged by unending conflict of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Government’s lack of commitment 
to end this war was attributed to (1) desire to suffocate and punish the North for not supporting 
Museveni’s regime (Boehm, 2011), and (2) prolonging this war was for purposes of rewarding 
Museveni’s military leaders (Mwenda and Tangiri, 2005), thanks to Ministry of Defense’s 
classified budgets. As a result, Northern Uganda has lagged behind due to decades of fighting 
until 2005 leaving Northern Uganda impoverished (UBOS, 2010).  
Thus, politically led patronage right from the executive to the lower street level 
bureaucrats has crippled civil service performance and its ability to deliver services efficiently 
prompting resentment by the general population. The influence of higher officials in the 
functioning of institutions not only exacerbates the already weak institutional capacity, but also 
affects the intended contribution of these institutions to service provision. Andrew M. Mwenda 
in his blog on April 13
th
 2013 made this description of President Museveni, “our president will 
tolerate a lot of things- public officials who loot the treasury with impunity, incompetent 
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ministers and civil servants who delay dams and roads or build substandard or ghost hospitals 
and schools……however if anything posed an existential threat to his power, Museveni will be 
quick, uncompromising and decisive”3. This is a clear indication of how far the Ugandan 
leadership is willing to go to ensure its continued stay in power. 
  
The Failure of Anti-Corruption Efforts “Fighting a Losing Battle” 
The burgeoning of corruption in Uganda is not due to lack of effort to fighting it but the complex 
system that allows those involved to go scot-free. Uganda’s political machinery benefits off 
corruption and sees the fight against corruption as one that can bring about its own downfall. As 
put by Mwenda, “President Museveni co-opts powerful elites from Uganda’s different religious 
and ethnic factions and by giving them positions of power, privilege, and influence in 
government, he is able to create a bridge between himself and their followers”4. This way, 
Museveni has used his unlimited powers to create a “more personal, patronage-based, executive-
centered and military reliant regime” (International Crisis Group, 2012) 
Uganda’s large institutional framework for anti-corruption that includes the Inspector 
General of Government’s (IGG), the anti-corruption court, the Criminal Investigation 
Department under the police, the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI), the Public 
Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority, the Auditor General (AG), and the Public 
Accounts Committee of Parliament have all been side stepped (Tangiri and Mwenda, 2006; 
Inspector General of Government, 2011). As reflected on the research framework, the central 
government through patronage heavily influences the activities of the anti-corruption institutions 
by protecting those under its network. This leaves the IGG for instance unable to prosecute those 
with connection to the central government (African Peer Review Mechanism, 2009; Global 
Integrity, 2011). In essence, these anti-corruption institutions will only peruse individual of no 
interest to the central government. As a result, such institutions have lost credibility and public 
trust to come true on their objective of fighting corruption. 
According to global integrity, Uganda has the largest “implementation gap” of all the 
countries covered in the report (Global Integrity, 2007). The implementation gap metric is used 
to capture the gap between a country’s anti-corruption laws and the actual enforcement of those 
same laws. Uganda’s legal framework for anti-corruption was ranked as “excellent” (98%); 
however, enforcement of this same framework was ranked as “very poor” (51%). In fact, as long 
as corrupt officials remain loyal to the president and the ruling party, there is very little chance of 
concrete action ever being taken against them. This is a clear indication of how patronage has 
seized the activities and decision making of the anti-corruption institutions to ensure its survival.  
According to World Bank, the perceived growing culture of impunity for grand 
corruption has limited the effectiveness of Anti-Corruption measure (World Bank, 2011). The 
2006 Freedom House report denounced the wide spread patronage and corruption in 
                                
3 http://andrewmwendasblog.blogspot.kr/2013/04/what-keeps-museveni-in-power.html 
4 http://andrewmwendasblog.blogspot.kr/2012/08/ugandas-anti-corruption-rituals.html 
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government
5
. Corruption has become an accepted way of life in Uganda (Maraka, 2009), to the 
extent that anyone appointed or elected to public office wants to take advantage of their 
appointment to enrich themselves. This only serves to show that much as Uganda has a variety of 
institutions mandated to fight corruption with a good legal basis from which to execute their 
duties, the decisions on who to prosecute lie outside these institutions and thus the large 
implementation gap. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of prosecution cases involving public corruption which resulted in a conviction 
Result of cases  2009 % 2010 % 2011 % 
Conviction  2 33 15 38.5 44 31.2 
Withdrawal  2 33 9 23.1 10 7.1 
Dismissed  0 0 11 28.2 43 30.5 
Acquitted  1 17 4 10.3 15 10.6 
Closed administratively 0 0 0 0 24 17 
Other (Order delivered)  0 0 0 0 5 3.6 
Not stated  1 17 0 0 0 0 
Total completed  6 100 39 100 141 100 
Ongoing cases  2  - 49  - 130  - 
Percentage resolved cases that  
required more than 12 months  - 0 2 5.1 14 8.5 
   Source: Anti-corruption Court, 2009-2011 
 
The trend in conviction of prosecution cases at the anti-corruption court shows a 
declining rate. By 2011 for instance, while 30.5% of cases resulted into dismissals, 10.6% were 
acquitted and 7.1% withdrawn, revealing the difficulties and interferences experienced in 
acquiring evidence especially in cases involving high level government officials. Where 
evidence has been more than compelling to warrant conviction, the IGG for instance without 
giving any reason, would abandon the case. Thus, just like in the colonial days when institutions 
catered for the interests of the British colonial administration, today’s anti-corruption 
enforcement agencies indirectly exist for the benefit of the state’s political machine. 
Consequently, majority of these convictions (31.2%) in 2011 are a reflection of cases involving 
low ranking bureaucrats without political connections.   
Lack of political will has commonly featured as a cause for failure of anti-corruption 
efforts (Brinkerhoff, 2000; Johnston, 2005, 11; Kpundeh, 1998; Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell, 
2010). This however shouldn’t be a problem in the face of strong institutions, for it’s the duty of 
such institutions to fight off such interference by making sure that rules are applied to everyone 
impartially. Nonetheless, in the case of Uganda, the ailing nature of institutions has enabled 
corrupt officials to instead hide behind these same institutions and despite President Museveni 
constantly waging numerous wars against corruption, his rhetoric has not translated into credible 
action making the fight against corruption an impossible one. On this note, Johnston argues that, 
                                
5 (http://www.freedomhouse.org 
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“weak institutions not only allow citizens and officials to seek elicit gains, at times with 
impunity; but also create incentives for more corruption as people seek protection in an uncertain 
environment” (Johnston, 2005, 38) 
To this end, regardless of the continued availability of resources to fight corruption 
especially from the international community, corruption in Uganda has continued to thrive 
(Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2010; Transparency International, 2006; 2010)
6
. This has made 
donors to threaten tough action inform of suspending aid disbursements until government takes 
credible measures against those involved in corruption. Even then nothing seems fruitful as 
political elites and bureaucrats protected by the patronage network continue to embezzle public 
funds and manipulate reforms to reproduce patronage and other practices that help them stay in 
power (Mwenda and Tangiri, 2005). Therefore unless anti-corruption institutions independently 
exercise their authority and overcome the web of patronage, the fight against corruption will 
always be a losing battle.   
 
Effects of Corruption on Ugandan Poor 
Ugandan government channels resources to the grassroots through the decentralization process 
(Bashaasha, Mangheni, and Nkonya, 2011). Unfortunately, local governments in Uganda, the 
highest being the district simply provide another layer of bureaucracy for misuse and capture of 
public funds by local government politicians and bureaucrats (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004), or 
call it the “decentralization of corruption”. According to Transparency International (2008)’s 
corruption perception index, rampant corruption jeopardizes the fight against poverty. Thus 
corruption has a direct bearing on the persistent levels of poverty (Chetwynd, Chetwynd, 
Spector, 2003). It is therefore no wonder that poverty has remained a bedfellow of most 
Ugandans with 62.9 per cent living on $2 a day (World Bank, 2013) 
The World Bank estimates that Uganda receives over 16% in direct official funding 
annually as development assistance. For instance in 2008, 2009 and 2010, the country received 
USD 1,641,470,000, 1,784,700,000 and 1,723,470,000 in aid respectively (World Bank, 2013). 
Unfortunately the poverty head count still stands at 24.5% ($1.25), and 62.9% ($2) below the 
poverty line. The main contributing element to this level of poverty has been corruption due to 
lack of transparency and citizens participation in development process. In his concept of 
“Official Moguls”, a concept of “reach out and squeeze someone”, Michael Johnston categorizes 
Uganda among the official moguls, a group of nations where powerful politicians and their 
favorites hold all the cards, and essentially, “few individuals take over and own everything” 
(Johnston, 2005). Indeed this is a perfect profile that fits Uganda’s situation considering that 50.7 
percent of income is held by the top 20 percent of the population and a majority 62.9 percent 
earns only $ 2 a day (World Bank, 2013). 
Corruption in Uganda being politically motivated has resulted into government’s inability 
to govern its citizens effectively. The inability of political institutions to reach out to citizens and 
give responsive services has seriously hindered the quantity and quality of public services 
consequently affecting the poor who mostly depend on them (Chetwynd, Chetwynd, and 
                                
6 www. transparency.org/cpi 
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Spector, 2003). In other words corruption increases poverty through its influence on governance. 
Consequently, this explains why sectors such as health are given lower priority than say defense 
where budgets are classified and thus easy to misuse.  
At the broadest level, corruption has brought inefficiencies in public expenditure by 
diverting resources to easily corruptible sectors and has distorted the allocation of resources and 
policy decisions (Hite, 2006). It basically “aggravates the living conditions of the poor people by 
distorting the entire decision making process connected to public sector programs”. In 2012, the 
office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of Public Service lost 60 billion Uganda Shillings 
(around $22 million) and 360 billion Uganda Shillings (around $131 million) respectively to 
corruption (Mwenda 2013). The biggest percentage of this money was mostly allocated for 
different projects and services related to the general public and considering that the poor are 
most dependent on government services, is fair to say that corruption of this kind indeed affects 
poverty reduction efforts further complicating their already difficult situation.  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
All said and done, the implementation of a strong legal and institutional framework for 
anticorruption in Uganda has faced many challenges with recent developments casting doubt on 
government’s commitment and sincerity to address corruption. It is therefore not a surprise that 
despite Global Integrity ranking Uganda strongly in terms of the quality of her anti-corruption 
law, the ranking was “very weak” in terms of enforcing this law (Global Integrity, 2009).  
As shown in the discussions above, this institutional weakness emanated from the British 
colonial system, which designed its administrative system to reward those who supported its 
interests. The Ugandan elites groomed by this system chose to stick with the same system upon 
the attainment of independence. This practice has had a great bearing on how institutions in 
Uganda fight both patronage and corruption with politicians in high political offices exerting 
their influence on the activities of anti-corruption institutions. The lack of independence of 
especially the Inspector General of Government has seen several high ranking government 
officials off the hook despite embezzling huge sums of public funds. Thus while other “countries 
have made fighting corruption and provision of public services through impartial institutions the 
cornerstone of their administrative authenticity, ruling elites in Uganda have made trading 
patronage among themselves the fulcrum of democratic politics”7.  
Owing to the above discussion, this study argues that corruption in Uganda has been 
systematic and intentioned by those in power as a rewarding system to the loyal and supportive 
elites of the ruling party, something that has become a culture at all levels. The tight grip held by 
political elites upon the activities of the anti-corruption institutions has made it impossible to 
fight patronage and corruption leaving the poor who mostly depend on government struggling to 
even fulfill the basic of needs. In this way, it is plausible to say that corruption undermines 
political development, flourishing where national institutions and guarantees of economic rights 
are weak. And much as corruption doesn’t explain all that is wrong in Ugandan society, it surely 
does negate all that is right in it and thus an indication of a deeper malady in need of urgent 
                                
7 http://andrewmwendasblog.blogspot.kr/2012/12/graft-thinking-out-of-box.html 
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attention.  
Unless anti-corruption institutions win back the legitimacy and support of the public in 
doing the job for which they were established to do, there is completely no reason for such 
institutions to be trusted in the fight against corruption. In the meantime, this study proposes 
citizen led interventions that are completely out of the reach of the political machine. This can 
take the form of widening and protecting citizens’ political involvement in national aspects that 
directly affect them. This can reduce their susceptibility to exploitation; boost their ability to 
effectively participate in politics and be able to check on the self-interested behavior of political 
elites and bureaucrats who make and implement policies respectively. When achieved, 
maintaining a steady patronage network with the needed discretion will be becomes difficult for 
corrupt officials curtailing the network in the process. 
Additionally, in Uganda where majority of the people have less access to information, the 
media and civil society can play a crucial role by exposing corrupt officials yet at the same time 
pointing out the options available to the public to take action in such matters that directly affect 
them. The media and civil society many not only expose corrupt official but can also take lead in 
agitating for institutional reforms aimed at giving a platform on which citizens’ views regarding 
the running and management of public offices is done. This way, both the media and civil society 
can act as mediators between the government and its citizens in ensuring public finances are 
handled with respect and put towards proper use. These and more can open up the government 
and in the process reduce the discretion that makes it possible for government officials to divert 
public resources for their own benefits.     
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